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Abstract
Opportunity costs of bed‐days are fundamental to understanding the value of
healthcare systems. They greatly influence burden of disease estimations and
economic evaluations involving stays in healthcare facilities. However,
different estimation techniques employ assumptions that differ crucially in
whether to consider the value of the second‐best alternative use forgone, of
any available alternative use, or the value of the actually chosen alternative.
Informed by economic theory, this paper provides a taxonomic framework of
methodologies for estimating the opportunity costs of resources. This taxonomy
is then applied to bed‐days by classifying existing approaches accordingly. We
highlight differences in valuation between approaches and the perspective
adopted, and we use our framework to appraise the assumptions and biases
underlying the standard approaches that have been widely adopted mostly
unquestioned in the past, such as the conventional use of reference costs and
administrative accounting data. Drawing on these findings, we present a novel
approach for estimating the opportunity costs of bed‐days in terms of health
forgone for the second‐best patient, but expressed monetarily. This alternative
approach effectively re‐connects to the concept of choice and explicitly
considers net benefits. It is broadly applicable across settings and for other
resources besides bed‐days.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
In healthcare settings, resources such as personnel and beds are scarce. Hence, choosing to treat or care for one patient
means a lost opportunity to treat or care for another patient in the presence of an unmet demand, as exemplified by
waiting lists. It is such a trade‐off that loosely embodies the economic notion of “opportunity costs”.
Most economic textbooks define opportunity costs similar to “the value of the next‐best alternative” forgone, and
others consider “(the value of) what is given up” (Ferraro & Taylor, 2005, p.10; Polley, 2015, p.7). Although
comparable, the second phrase lacks an explicit valuation ranking (O'Donnell, 2010), that is, it is not clear whether
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to take the value of the second‐best alternative use, of any available alternative use, or of the actually chosen use.
Moreover, the understanding of “costs” also differs between disciplines, with economists focusing on choosing
between different possible courses of action given limited resources, and accountants focusing on recovering histor-
ical expenditures for financial planning and reporting (Mogyorosy & Smith, 2005). For economists, only factors relat-
ing to a sacrifice from making a particular decision are relevant “pain costs” (i.e., costs “felt” by the decision maker),
but factors not associated with a sacrifice from that decision are irrelevant “sunk costs” (Buchanan, 1969). This is
most obvious for factors fixed in time due to contractual obligations, which cannot be significantly reduced in the
short‐term, with variable cost factors becoming the sacrifice of a choice to be made.
Major health economic textbooks endorse valuing opportunity costs with the second‐best alternative forgone
(Drummond, Sculpher, Torrance, O'Brien, & Stoddart, 2005; Folland, Goodman, & Stano, 2010; Gray, Clarke,
Wolstenholme, & Wordsworth, 2010), particularly for resources without a market price. A “shadow price” is then derived
to represent the “true social value (or opportunity cost) of non‐marketed resources, such as time and informal care” (Palmer
& Raftery, 1999, p.1552). For marketable resources, however, the market price, reference costs and average accounting
expenditure of the chosen alternative are conventionally considered to approximate the opportunity costs for pragmatic rea-
sons (Drummond et al., 2005). Explicit consideration of the second‐best alternative is hence dropped and although common
practice, this is only adequate under the idealistic market conditions of perfect competition (Buchanan, 1969; Jit et al., 2011).
Given the well‐known market failures in healthcare (Arrow, 1963; Pauly, 1968), this paper scrutinises the estimation
techniques that have been adopted in the past mostly without questioning the underlying assumptions and biases. We
consider healthcare beds as prime example of an imperfectly‐marketed resource whose opportunity costs may in fact
diverge from the values calculated using conventional methods, not least because hospitals are multiproduct firms with
a complex production function in which different units may operate internally as individual profit centres. Bed‐days are
also a highly influential cost component of any analysis involving stays in healthcare facilities (Drummond et al., 2005).
Therefore, we investigated how to adequately estimate the economic value of bed‐days, with a special focus on decision‐
making agents aiming to maximise health.
The paper is structured as follows: Our methods and sources are outlined next. In the results, we compile a general
taxonomy of methodologies for estimating the opportunity costs of resources. We then focus on the resource “bed‐day”
and present co‐existing approaches that we classify according to the taxonomy. To distinguish the theoretical
methodologies for resources from the practical applications for bed‐days, we use the terms “methodology” and
“approach”, respectively. We illustrate and appraise the approaches before proposing a novel alternative. The proposal
and paper are then discussed before offering concluding remarks.
2 | METHODS
First, theoretical methodologies of estimating opportunity costs were categorised in a taxonomy based on (reviews of)
economic textbooks (Drummond et al., 2005; Ferraro & Taylor, 2005; O'Donnell, 2010; Polley, 2014, 2015; Stone, 2015)
as well as James Buchanan's treatise on the concept's origins up to the late 1960s and diverging views among orthodox
(neo‐classical) and heterodox (subjectivist) schools of economics (Buchanan, 1969).
Second, existing applications for the valuation of bed‐days were identified through a scoping review of the health and
economics literature. Relevant articles were initially searched for up to 28 November 2014 in two bibliographic databases:
PubMed (NLM) and EconLit (Ovid). Additionally, the reference lists of all articles screened in full‐text were subsequently
checked for relevance. The search was last updated on 02 December 2016, using the following search terms: “bed‐day”
AND (costs OR demand* OR valu*); “opportunity costs” AND (bed‐day OR health* OR hospital*) for details of the syntax
see Table A1 in the Appendix. All articles were included that directly applied an approach to estimate the opportunity
costs of bed‐days or one suitable for bed‐days. Records were excluded that did not entail any approach of estimation or
any suitable approach for bed‐days, were not written in English, or did not include a full‐text article. Articles using wage
rates were also excluded although their relevance to our work is discussed later, and the general idea of multiplying time
with a monetary value is incorporated in one of the approaches. The identified applications in the articles were then gen-
eralised and clustered into different approaches, which in turn were classified according to our taxonomic framework.
Third, we compared and appraised the different approaches to explore their impact on bed‐day values. Drawing on
these findings, we developed a novel approach for valuing the opportunity costs of bed‐days in line with economic theory
and from the perspective of a decision maker aiming to maximise health with limited resources.
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3 | RESULTS
3.1 | General taxonomy of methodologies to estimate the opportunity costs of resources
Early economic theorists initially interpreted opportunity costs in terms of units of a displaced alternative product: “If
among a nation of hunters […] it usually costs twice the labour [time] to kill a beaver which it costs to kill a deer, one
beaver should naturally exchange for or be worth two deer” (Smith, 1776). In this simplified example, hunting deer is
the second‐best alternative for the hunters, and the relative costs of production reflect the true opportunity costs of
the hunters' labour time (Buchanan, 1969).
Departing from natural units was seen as necessary by economists to account for the monetary value used in
almost all kinds of exchange (Buchanan, 1969; Robbins, 1932). Opportunity costs should then be represented by
the net benefit (i.e., benefit minus expenditure; also called the natural or accounting profit) to account for different
benefits and expenditures associated with alternative options (O'Donnell, 2010; Polley, 2014). The second‐highest
net benefit, that is, the second‐best alternative to choose, constitutes the true opportunity costs (Ferraro & Taylor,
2005; Polley, 2015), with all other alternatives comprising trade‐off costs (O'Donnell, 2010). Moreover, the opportunity
costs should not be confused with the economic profit, which is the difference of the highest and second‐highest net
benefits (O'Donnell, 2010).
For reasons of practicality, orthodox neoclassical economists then moved to an interpretation of the value of the
displaced product being approximated by the expenditure on the alternative chosen. Its costs of production are assumed
to reflect the value of a forgone alternative that could have been produced had the same amount of money been spent on
it instead (Buchanan, 1969; Drummond et al., 2005). This interpretation is valid for perfectly competitive markets as
there will be no alternative, more profitable use of resources at the equilibrium price of supply and demand (i.e., it is
“Pareto efficient”; see the first optimality theorem of welfare economics; Folland et al., 2010). It is thus a special situation
where the values of all alternatives converge, making net benefits irrelevant in the absence of profitable alternatives as
their benefits equal their expenditures.
Due to externalities and information asymmetries, most markets fail to reach the competitive equilibrium
(Greenwald & Stiglitz, 1986), including healthcare (Arrow, 1963). Expenditures will then not readily reflect opportu-
nity costs as profits/losses indicate a better use of resources existing elsewhere. Thus in case the optimal alternative is
not chosen, the opportunity costs will need to include the optimal profit forgone (Buchanan, 1969). A recent proposal
generalised this as adding the incurred expenditure (the “explicit cost”) and the highest net benefit forgone (the
“implicit cost”) as opportunity costs (Stone, 2015), which is broadly considered equivalent to “economic costs”
(O'Donnell, 2010; Stone, 2015). Yet, this fails to adequately correct for any competitive disequilibrium of the optimal
alternative.
Altogether, four different methodologies have evolved over time and comprise our taxonomy:
A. Opportunity costs in terms of units of the second‐best alternative forgone;
B. Opportunity costs as the net benefit of the second‐best alternative forgone;
C. Opportunity costs as the expenditure of the alternative chosen; and
D. Opportunity costs as the expenditure of the alternative chosen plus the net benefit of the alternative forgone with
the greatest value.
Illustrated with two options i and j, where j is the next‐best alternative to i, the value of the marginal opportunity
costs of option i, OCi, can be formulated. Marginality (Folland et al., 2010) refers here to the change in costs and benefits
(or units of option j) when providing/treating one more unit of option i. Also, “next‐best” here means “second‐best”
when referring to Methodologies A and B, but it means the alternative with the greatest value when referring to
Methodology D. The four methodologies then read:
OCi ¼ uj (1)
OCi ¼ uj Bj−Cj
 
(2)
OCi ¼ Ci (3)
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OCi ¼ Ci þ uj Bj−Cj
 
(4)
where uj denotes the number of units of the next‐best alternative forgone, the net benefit is calculated by subtracting the
marginal expenditure of the next‐best alternative, Cj, from its marginal gross benefit, Bj, and Ci is the marginal expendi-
ture of the alternative chosen. Generally, expenditures are a sacrifice, typically of money, and benefits a gain, typically
valued as the minimum willingness to trade‐off, that is, pay or sell depending on the perspective, also known as the mar-
ginal rate of substitution (Polley, 2015; Stone, 2015), or expressed in health outcomes such as the quality‐adjusted life
year, QALY.
As can be seen, Equation 2 extends Equation 1 with the net benefit of the number of units of the second‐best option j
forgone, and Equation 4 is the sum of Equations 3 and 2.
3.2 | Existing approaches to estimate the opportunity costs of bed‐days
The scoping review of existing applications suitable to estimate the opportunity costs of bed‐days identified 2,273 records.
After the screening and review procedure, 101 relevant articles remained; see Figure A1 in the Appendix. We generalised
applications and clustered them into nine approaches, each of which could be classified under one of the four method-
ologies of our taxonomy. Sixteen articles applied multiple approaches; for a complete list of included references, see
Table A2 in the Appendix.
An overview of the nine existing approaches applied for an option (read: patient) i is shown in Table 1, together with
the results of a numerical illustration and our new proposals presented later. Note that all approaches require informa-
tion on an alternative option except for those following Methodology C.
3.2.1 | Methodology A: Opportunity costs in terms of units of the second‐best alternative
forgone
Two approaches used the first methodology by expressing units of the second‐best alternative as patient‐equivalents
(Approach 1) or treatment‐equivalents (Approach 2).
Patient‐equivalents were calculated in terms of the number of alternative patients that could have been treated using
the same resources, for example, bed‐days, differently. Frequently, the alternative patient was (implicitly) approximated
by the average patient population likely to occupy that bed. One article additionally adjusted for an occupancy rate of
0.75 (Coughlan & O'Neill, 2001).
Treatment‐equivalents were calculated in terms of the number of alternative treatments that could have been paid
for using the same expenditure incurred differently. Resources such as beds are hence assumed to be monetised and
the money spent elsewhere within healthcare.
Based on Equation 1, Approaches 1 and 2 can be written as:
OCi ¼ LOSi 1LOSj
OCRð Þ (1:1)
OCi ¼ Ci 1Cj (1:2)
where LOSi is the incurred resource consumption of bed‐days, LOSj is the resource consumption of the forgone
alternative patient, OCR is the (optional) occupancy rate of bed‐days, Ci is the expenditure incurred, and Cj is the expen-
diture of the forgone alternative use (e.g., treatments). For didactic reasons, we have separated fractions into two terms to
demonstrate how to value the units consumed by patient i.
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3.2.2 | Methodology B: Opportunity costs as the net benefit of the second‐best alternative
forgone
The second methodology was used by four approaches that valued the units measured either monetarily (Approach 3) or
in terms of the health benefit, usually QALYs, using patient‐equivalents (Approach 4) and/or local cost‐effectiveness
thresholds (Approaches 5 and 6). Not all articles using patient‐equivalents reported them separately.
TABLE 1 Overview of approaches to value the opportunity costs of bed‐days used for patient i
Approach Description Equation Results for patient i
Methodology A: Units of the second‐best alternative forgone
1 Patient‐equivalents (of second‐best patients j) forgone
LOSi
1
LOSj
OCRð Þ 2
2 Treatment‐equivalents forgone for the second‐best
patients j
Ci
1
Cj
1.4
Methodology B: Net benefit of the second‐best alternative forgone
Valuation in terms of money
3a Expenditure forgone on the second‐best
patient‐equivalents
LOSi
Cj
LOSj
£10,000
3b Revenue forgone from the second‐best
patient‐equivalents
LOSi
Rj
LOSj
OCRð Þ £12,000
3c Net revenue forgone from the second‐best
patient‐equivalents LOSi
 Rj−Cj
 
LOSj
£2,000
5 Gross monetary benefit forgone for the second‐best
patient‐equivalents LOSi
 Bj
λ
 
LOSj
£24,000
New1 Net monetary benefit forgone for the second‐best
patient‐equivalents LOSi
 Bj
λ−Cj
 
LOSj
£14,000
New2 Net monetary benefit forgone for the second‐best
treatment‐equivalents Ci
 Bj
λ−Cj
 
Cj
£9,800
Valuation in terms of health benefit (typically QALYs)
4 Gross health benefit forgone for second‐best
patient‐equivalents
LOSi
Bj
LOSj
1.2
6 Health benefit forgone for expected second‐best use
Ci
1
λ
0.35
New3 Net health benefit forgone for the second‐best
patient‐equivalents
LOSi
Bj−
Cj
λ
  
LOSj
0.7
New4 Net health benefit forgone for the second‐best
treatment‐equivalents
Ci
Bj−
Cj
λ
  
Cj
0.49
Methodology C: Expenditure of the alternative chosen
7 Expenditure for the resource consumption incurred
LOSi
Ci
LOSi
£7,000
8 Separating variable expenditure and non‐monetary
resource consumption
LOSi
VCi
LOSi
&LOSi
£3,500 & 10
Methodology D: Expenditure of the alternative chosen + highest net
benefit forgone
9 Expenditure incurred + highest net revenue forgone
LOSi
Ci
LOSi
þ Rj−Cj
 
LOSj
 
£9,000
New5 Expenditure incurred + highest net monetary benefit forgone
LOSi
Ci
LOSi
þ Bj
λ−Cj
 
LOSj
 
£21,000
The last column illustrates the marginal opportunity costs of patient i consuming 10 bed‐days based on the input data in Table 2. Not all articles used LOS. The
equations were rearranged to show how the resource consumption of patient i should be valued; we thus included LOSi in approach 7 and 8 to make this val-
uation clearer. Our new proposals are labelled with “New”; we favour “New1” (and “New5”, depending on whether the chosen alternative was the sub‐optimal
choice) given the minor impact of monetary inflation compared to treatment‐equivalents.
Bj = (health) benefit gained per second‐best patient, Ci = total expenditure incurred for i, Cj = expenditure incurred per second‐best patient, λ = monetary value
assigned to QALYs in local cost‐effectiveness thresholds, LOSi = total bed‐day consumption of i, LOSj = length of stay per second‐best patient, OCR = occupancy
rate, QALY = quality‐adjusted life year, R = revenue per patient, VC = variable cost proportion of the expenditure.
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Monetary values took on providers' forgone gross expenditures, payment losses (mostly diagnosis‐related groups), or
net revenue losses. One article adjusted the revenue in sensitivity analyses by 0–25% to account for an occupancy rate of
0.75–1.00 (Bayley et al., 2005).
The health benefit was usually expressed as the expected number of QALYs lost as a result of not being able to treat
patients using the resources expended. For the patient‐equivalents forgone, one study derived QALY‐gain values from
the published literature (Leroux, Morton, & Rivas, 2014). Another study recently aimed to estimate reimbursement
tariffs by multiplying the marginal (gross) benefit with an assumed social value of a QALY of £50,000 (Kristensen,
Siciliani, & Sutton, 2016). Others quantified the expected health benefit as the QALYs forgone of concurrently
disinvested existing interventions (Oliver, 2002), or, more generally, by dividing the incurred expenditure by the
monetary value assigned to health effects, taking as reference a conversion factor representing the cost‐effectiveness of
marginal interventions paid for out of the same budget, that is, the local cost‐effectiveness threshold (Cookson,
Drummond, & Weatherly, 2009; Coyle, Cheung, & Evans, 2014).
Based on Equation 2, Approaches 3(a–c), 4, 5, and 6 can be written as:
OCi ¼ LOSi CjLOSj (2:1a)
OCi ¼ LOSi RjLOSj
OCRð Þ (2:1b)
OCi ¼ LOSi
Rj−Cj
 
LOSj
(2:1c)
OCi ¼ LOSi BjLOSj (2:2)
OCi ¼ LOSi Bj
λ
LOSj
(2:3)
OCi ¼ Ci1λ (2:4)
where Rj is the revenue of the forgone alternative patient, Bj the health gain from treatment in terms of QALYs for the
forgone alternative patient, and λ is the monetary value assigned to health effects as for example, expressed in local cost‐
effectiveness thresholds.
3.2.3 | Methodology C: Opportunity costs as expenditure of the alternative chosen
The third methodology was used by two approaches, mainly differing in whether to multiply results (Approach 7) or
present them separately (Approach 8).
The (health) economic convention of valuing the actually chosen alternative was widely followed by taking either
market prices, national tariffs and payment sources, average expenditures from budgets and accounts, or reference costs.
Stated‐preference techniques such as willingness‐to‐pay surveys were also used to elicit values.
Given that the opportunity costs of fixed resources such as bed‐days or clinic slots are not always adequately reflected
by the monetary value of prices and payments, especially in the short run, they may be separated from the variable costs
related to other consumables. In the short term, variable costs better indicate cost changes according to changes in
resource consumption as no cash savings will be realised for the fixed costs proportion (Graves et al., 2007).
Based on Equation 3, Approaches 7 and 8 can then be written as:
OCi ¼ LOSi CiLOSi (3:1)
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OCi ¼ LOSi VCiLOSi & LOSi (3:2)
where VCi is the variable cost proportion of the expenditure incurred.
3.2.4 | Methodology D: Opportunity costs as the expenditure of the alternative chosen
plus the highest net benefit forgone
The fourth methodology was used by one approach (Approach 9). Opportunity costs were represented as the (total) eco-
nomic costs for providers, even though most articles identified opportunity costs as only the forgone net revenues; for
instance: “The sum of opportunity cost and total cost defines the true cost of a surgical device” (Chatterjee, Chen,
Goldenberg, Bae, & Finlayson, 2010, p.1076).
Based on Equation 4, Approach 9 can be written as:
OCi ¼ LOSi CiLOSi þ
Rj−Cj
 
LOSj
 
(4:1)
3.3 | Illustrative comparison of approaches for valuing bed‐days
To highlight differences between the approaches, we present an illustrative example with three patients P1, P2, and P3. To
clarify the concept of making a choice between multiple alternative options, more than two patients are presented here
following previous recommendations to avoid framing opportunity costs as binary decision problems (Ferraro & Taylor,
2005). Also, the second‐best use of bed‐days is assumed to not lie outside the healthcare sector.
Table 2 contains hypothetical values required for the illustration. Following an agent's objective of, for example,
health or income maximisation, the known case mix is ranked as specifically as possible (e.g., on a ward level) to identify
the patient with the highest net value. The existing approaches express the benefit as either monetary revenue or QALYs,
which we chose to be the highest for patient P1 here; it is the optimally chosen patient i. Where applicable, this patient is
compared to the second‐best alternative patient j (more precisely: patient group); in our example patient P2 and not P3.
Note that the highest valued patient and the second‐best patient are unlikely to be each other's second‐best alternative;
this is only true for the special case of identical marginal opportunity costs.
The value of the opportunity costs for the 10 bed‐days consumed by treating one patient i (i.e., what treating that
patient is “worth”) according to the nine approaches is shown in Table 1. The results vary widely, even within the same
methodology and when standardising the unit of outcome, suggesting that further appraisal of the approaches is needed.
TABLE 2 Input data to illustrate the approaches to value opportunity costs
Occupancy rate 1.0a
Cost‐effectiveness threshold (£) 20,000/QALY
Patient(s) P1 P2 P3
Units (bed‐days per patient) 10b 5 5
Expenditure (£ per patient) 7,000 (variable: 3,500) 5,000 5,000
Benefit (£ revenue per patient) 9,000 6,000 5,500
Benefit (QALY gain per patient)c 1.3 0.6 0.4
Note that all values are illustrative. Based on the highest (net) benefit expressed either monetarily or in QALYs, patient P1 is the optimally chosen patient i,
patient P2 is the second‐best patient j, and patient P3 is the third‐best patient.
QALY = quality‐adjusted life year.
aAssumes full capacity and that freed beds are efficiently redeployed (Drummond et al., 2005),
bExcess consumption (not necessarily the total length of stay),
cAttributable to the treatment.
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3.4 | Appraisal of existing approaches
The approach used to value bed‐days, and consequently the units in which their costs are expressed, must be chosen to
match the decision‐making agent's objective(s). In our illustration based on the existing approaches, different agents
such as providers, payers, or society may seek to maximise natural units, expenditures, revenues, net revenues, or health
outcomes.
Approaches 1 and 2 lend themselves for analyses of natural units, for example, to maximise throughput. Expressing
the relative costs of production as the exchange rate between natural units (Approach 1) reflects the true value of com-
peting resource consumptions more accurately than the exchange rate between the expenditures associated with the nat-
ural units (Approach 2) given the independence of monetary inflation. In fact, if the expected exchange value differs
from the expected cost value, a change in the optimal choice may occur (Buchanan, 1969). In our example, the expen-
diture of the 2 patient‐equivalents forgone is only valued as 1.4 treatment equivalents. Hence, an agent aiming to
maximise throughput regards treating patient i less favourable, which likely distorts the bed‐days' true value.
Providers aiming tomaximise income can readily calculate net benefits in the form of net revenues using Equation 2.1c
of Approach 3. The other equations of Approach 3, as well as Approaches 7 and 8, takemerely the expenditure or payment,
which makes the strong assumption of prices being at the equilibrium point of the perfectly competitive market model,
requiring fulfilment of all conditions characterising such markets (Folland et al., 2010; Henry & Searles, 2012). This is
unlikely given market imperfections in healthcare of, for example, quasi‐monopolies and price controls, information
asymmetries, patents and licencing requirements, and non‐identical products (Arrow, 1963; Henry & Searles, 2012; Lave
et al., 1994; Rattinger, Jain, Ju, &Mullins, 2008). Hence, spending £1 is unlikely to generate a benefit (revenue) equivalent
to £1. This is illustrated in Table 2 for patients P2 and P3, for which we kept the bed‐day consumption and expenditures
identical but varied the benefits, which determined P2 as second‐best patient j and P3 as third‐best patient. Approaches
7 and 8 additionally do not explicitly consider the second‐best alternative forgone. Approach 9 aims to correct for
alternatives being in competitive disequilibrium, but requires identifying options as optimal and non‐optimal. It also does
not correct for distortions of the optimal alternative's price, still producing flawed results then.
For payers and societies aiming to maximise health, health outcomes form the relevant benefit. The conversion of
expenditures into QALYs (Approach 6) has been criticised for the missing link to actually displaced or unfunded services
(Coyle et al., 2014). More importantly, Approaches 4, 5, and 6 do not calculate net benefits and may be less suitable for
subsequent economic studies; more on this in the discussion. Hence, no approach currently exists that calculates net
benefits for bed‐days using health outcomes.
3.5 | Proposing an alternative to valuing bed‐days
Expressing the health benefit in monetary terms is exactly what is captured with the net monetary benefit, NMB
(Claxton, 1999; Tambour, Zethraeus, & Johannesson, 1998), which is defined incrementally as:
NMB ¼ ΔBλ−ΔC (5)
where ΔB is the incremental benefit between two healthcare interventions, λ the monetary value per unit of health
benefit gained as, for example, defined by a local cost‐effectiveness threshold, and ΔC the incremental expenditure
between two healthcare interventions. Note that the NMB calculates the net benefit as required in Equation 2 of Meth-
odology B. For our purposes, we exploit the idea of valuing health gains monetarily with conventional cost‐effectiveness
thresholds as shown in Equation 5. Thus, decision makers aiming to maximise health can account for the net benefit of
patient j forgone as follows:
OCi ¼ LOSi
Bjλ−Cj
 
LOSj

OCR (2:5)
where Bj is the marginal health gain from hospital treatment for the second‐best patient and Cj denotes the marginal
expenditure incurred on the hospital treatment of the second‐best patient, for payers thus the reimbursement payment.
Note that the health benefit ought to account for the marginal gain of patients from treatment to avoid the contradictory
conclusion that patients in no need of care will benefit the most from a hospital bed (e.g., a perfectly healthy individual
with a utility score of 1), and to capture any changes in health occurring without the treatment; cf. discussion. In
8 SANDMANN ET AL.
healthcare settings operating near full capacity and in the presence of an unmet demand from otherwise treated patients
awaiting admission, the term OCR is to be omitted.
Applied to the data in Table 2, the opportunity costs of the bed‐days consumed by patient i equal £14,000 in terms of
net benefits forgone for the second‐best patients j. By considering health maximisation as objective and the net monetary
value of the forgone QALYs, this differs from the values calculated with the existing approaches of Methodology B, that
is, providers' expenditures of £10,000, revenue of £12,000, net revenue of £2,000, gross monetary benefit of £24,000, and
1.2 gross QALYs forgone. Moreover, if the chosen alternative had not been optimal, Methodology D would need to be
used.
OCi ¼ LOSi CiLOSi þ
Bjλ−Cj
 
LOSj
 
(4:2)
However, P1 was the optimal choice as indicated in Table 3; it had the highest net benefit of all three alternatives, and
only for P1 were the sum of the expenditure and the highest net benefit forgone smaller than the benefit incurred. Thus,
the true value of the opportunity costs for the 10 bed‐days is here equal to the forgone second‐best net benefit of £14,000.
4 | DISCUSSION
This paper explored different estimation techniques for valuing the opportunity costs of resources. Although seen as
fundamental in defining economics (Buchanan, 1969; O'Donnell, 2010; Robbins, 1932) and health economics
(Drummond et al., 2005; Mushkin, 1958; Palmer & Raftery, 1999; Russell, 1992), the concept's underlying assumptions
are frequently disregarded for reasons of pragmatism. As a result, the special case of perfect competition has become a
widespread standard, despite it effectively disconnecting the choice problem from the mutually‐exclusive, second‐best
use forgone. It is hence unsurprising to us that this definition made it into numerous economic textbooks as the con-
vention for estimating opportunity costs (O'Donnell, 2010), fuelling the confusion of professional economists and
others alike (Ferraro & Taylor, 2005).
When assigning cost values to resources, it is important for researchers to make their assumptions explicit, including
on the aim, perspective, the associated consequences, and “any adjustments made to approximate to opportunity costs”
(Husereau et al., 2013). Incorrectly attaching high cost values may give decision makers the illusion of potentially large
cost savings of a programme that reduces resource consumption, and the actual cost savings may be more modest due to
only being realisable on the variable cost components and if the freed fixed resources were almost immediately re‐
deployed (Drummond et al., 2005; Graves et al., 2010). This is especially true for the short run, during which a high pro-
portion of fixed costs will not change and hence should not influence the value of a particular choice from an economic
viewpoint (Dawson, 1994; Graves et al., 2010).
As for the imperfectly‐marketed resource “bed‐days”, the existing approaches to costing produce results that differ
widely. When using our framework to appraise the underlying assumptions, we revealed how approximations of the true
value of bed‐days may be flawed and violate economic theory, depending on the chosen perspective. This includes the
conventional use of reference costs, as the second‐best alternative is usually not explicitly accounted for. Moreover, aver-
age costs are unlikely to represent the marginal costs of producing one more unit (i.e., bed‐day) as the bulk of treatment
costs can be expected to occur towards the beginning of a stay (Drummond et al., 2005). More generally, it can be
questioned whether it is appropriate to adopt the ideas valid for the competitive market model to the imperfect
healthcare market (Dawson, 1994). Nonetheless, many applications resorted to consider merely expenditures or
TABLE 3 Opportunity cost results of the 10 bed‐days used for patient P1 for decision makers aiming to maximise health
Patient(s) P1 (n = 1) P2 (n = 2 forgone) P3 (n = 2 forgone)
Expenditure (£ in total) 7,000 10,000 10,000
Benefit (GMB, £ in total) 26,000 24,000 16,000
NMB (benefit‐expenditure, £ in total) 19,000 14,000 6,000
Expenditure + highest NMB forgone 21,000 29,000 29,000
Note. GMB = gross monetary benefit, NMB = net monetary benefit, QALY = quality‐adjusted life year.
Based on the highest (net) benefit expressed either monetarily or in QALYs, patient P1 is the optimally chosen patient i, patient P2 is the second‐best patient j, and
patient P3 is the third‐best patient. Figures in bold correspond to approaches (and values) covered in the overview table.
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payments. None of the existing approaches valued the health gain associated with bed‐days in terms of the net benefit.
Consequently, we developed a novel approach using the net monetary benefit of second‐best patients, which we assert is
most suitable for decision makers aiming to maximise health within a fixed healthcare budget, such as the National
Health Service in the United Kingdom and its counterparts in other healthcare systems.
To value health outcomes monetarily, we follow the idea of using local cost‐effectiveness thresholds (Claxton,
1999; Tambour et al., 1998). Although controversial (Neumann, Cohen, & Weinstein, 2014), these thresholds are used
in actual healthcare decision making (Drummond, 2013; Schwarzer et al., 2015). Such thresholds can also be esti-
mated on the basis of displaced services at a system level either theoretically based on the decision maker's preference
(Eckermann, 2015; Eckermann & Pekarsky, 2014) or empirically based on the opportunity costs of healthcare
spending (Claxton et al., 2015). When assuming that expenditures not spent on bed‐days could be spent elsewhere
in the healthcare system, which is the assumption behind reference costs, a general threshold should be used; other-
wise a disease‐specific threshold may be more sensible when beds saved have to be filled by alternative patients
within the same specialty or setting.
As an alternative to the NMB one could use the net health benefit, NHB (Stinnett & Mullahy, 1998); see Table 1 for
the additional equations. Although illustrative to quantify the expected health benefits forgone, the outcome is then con-
verted to units such as QALYs, which do not have an equivalent expression for other resources and outside the health
sector. Hence, we prefer the NMB as in Equation 2.5, whose monetary units also underline its character of being an alter-
native to conventional methods. Likewise, next to patient‐equivalents one could resort to treatment‐equivalents, bearing
in mind that expenditures encounter monetary inflation and may result in distorted bed‐day values (cf. Section 3.4).
Ideally, our approach is used by observing actually displaced treatments or patients in a particular setting. For
instance, if Table 2 showed three actual patients, not patient groups, the 10 bed‐days consumed by P1 could have been
used to treat both displaced patients P2 and P3 as each consumed 5 bed‐days. However, we acknowledge that such obser-
vations are not always practical or indeed possible, for example, when actual patients do not even present at a healthcare
facility given their pre‐existing knowledge that they cannot be treated there (e.g., for capacity constraints). To enhance
generalisability, a pragmatic compromise may be to use patient groups from the regular patient population awaiting
admission to a particular ward. Potential heterogeneity of patients should be taken into account by, for example, consid-
ering patient sub‐groups. From a payer perspective, specific reimbursement payments may be taken as expenditure for
the different patient groups, possibly adjusted for price distortions such as subsidies (Drummond et al., 2005) or exces-
sively high taxes (Donaldson, 1990). In settings with local cost‐effectiveness thresholds, the marginal length of stay,
expenditure, and health benefit of the forgone patients then need to be determined. These could, for example, be approx-
imated context‐specifically with an average from national or local studies. Note that from the healthcare payer perspec-
tive, the marginal expenditure and length of stay are equivalent to the actual reimbursement payment and length of stay
given that without hospitalisation, there is no hospital treatment to pay for nor will patients have consumed any hospital
resources. Conversely, the marginal health gain of patients from a particular hospital treatment will depend on the con-
dition analysed in order to account for changes in health without treatment, including for example, death for otherwise
fatal conditions if not medically attended in hospital, and the alleviation and prevention of symptoms or disease for non‐
life‐threatening conditions. Health benefit estimations could be based on the natural history of diseases, representative
health data such as disability weights from the Global Burden of Disease Study (Salomon et al., 2015) or quality‐of‐life
scores for diseased and healthy populations (Claxton et al., 2015), and potentially even standard care for conditions
for which it would be impracticable or unethical to determine the natural course; see the Appendix for two illustrations
of such implementations.
Special consideration may be needed for temporary decreases in supply and increases in demand for bed‐days follow-
ing exogenous shocks (i.e., unplanned events) such as infectious disease epidemics (Plowman et al., 2001), heat waves,
cold weather, natural disasters, strikes of healthcare personnel, or sudden reductions in funding. For example, for infec-
tious disease outbreaks calculations of total length‐of‐stay may be subject to time‐dependent biases with only a propor-
tion being an “excess” stay (Graves et al., 2010), and the isolation or closure of bays and wards may lead to additional
bed‐days lost unoccupied. Altogether, all beds lost attributable to the exogenous shock should be added to the number
of bed‐days consumed by treating patients during an avoidable event. Adjusting bed occupancy to account for capacity
should only be done in situations where there is no excess demand (i.e., no shortages or waiting lists). No opportunity
costs will then be attached to the empty beds in terms of health forgone for other patients, and other than the cash value
of reducing the idle capacity in the long‐term (with associated consequences on marginal expenditures and revenues).
However, full capacity does not mean all beds being occupied; besides, there may be other limiting factors than the occu-
pancy rate, for example, the theatre use rate for surgical patients.
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4.1 | Strengths and limitations
We based our taxonomy of methodologies on extensive reviews of the concept of opportunity costs, including 22 well‐
known economic textbooks (O'Donnell, 2010) as well as James Buchanan's comprehensive treatise (Buchanan, 1969).
Existing applications to value bed‐days were searched for in a scoping review due to our aim and the paucity of relevant
and consistently used search terms. Included articles covered a wide range of journals, interventions, and disease areas
(see Appendix), which may point towards the general relevance of an interest in the topic among healthcare professions,
as well as the broad applicability for our novel approach.
Although we did not explicitly consider indirect costs using wage rates as proxy for opportunity costs, these applica-
tions are addressed in Approach 3 as the time loss is simply multiplied with a wage rate. Also, in reporting the results of
our review, we did not state the number of articles or applications of each approach. Our intent was to focus on the
differences per approach and not on the number of applications per approach, which in any case may be biased towards
those that are practical given the data available to authors rather than those based on sound theoretical methodology.
Focusing on “bed‐days” has advantages as it is a broadly used resource across indications, a major cost driver and
hence influential for all kinds of analyses involving patient stays, relatively easy to measure through “length of stay”,
and universally used (across countries, time and settings such as hospitals, long‐term care, and mental health facilities).
Additionally, the opportunity costs of bed‐days lost due to isolation or closure of wards can be calculated on the same scale
as those directly consumed by patients. By identifying bed‐days as resources, this paper concentrated on the last two steps
of costing of identification, measurement, and valuation (Drummond et al., 2005; Mogyorosy & Smith, 2005). As such, our
approach anchors on the identified resource itself as the most important unit to measure costs. Then continuing to value
the resources with the marginal net benefit is important to account for the different health benefits and expenditures asso-
ciated with alternative options (cf. Methodology B), although a disaggregated presentation may facilitate a broader and
more explicit multi‐criteria decision analysis framework, for example, when thinking about the value of reducing waiting
lists or when incorporating non‐pecuniary decision factors such as emotional distress. Moreover, one could also try to
elicit the preferences for bed‐days to patients and providers; see, for example, (Stewardson, Harbarth, Graves, & TIMBER
Study Group, 2014) for a study on the willingness‐to‐pay of 11 hospital administrators.
Despite our focus on bed‐days, the concepts presented in this paper can be readily adapted to other goods and
resources used to treat patients, such as operating theatre slots or time spent in a general practitioner clinic, as well as
to evaluations with other economic perspectives and optimisation objectives. As our illustration was based on existing
applications, it considered either health, throughput, or (net) revenue maximisation but not equity concerns.
Although our approach values opportunity costs with the NMB, it is not used incrementally here to evaluate two or
more different healthcare interventions (Drummond et al., 2005). A full economic evaluation requires additional input
parameters for different interventions, including at least their expenditures and effectiveness. Also note that we consider
a broader perspective for the opportunity costs across indications (e.g., the second‐best alternative patient for specific
wards), and economic evaluations typically compare a new intervention to standard care within indications (which is
presumed to be the second‐best alternative treatment for specific diseases).
Lastly, adequate costing may be quite complex but attempting to identify the second‐best patients improves the
existing pragmatic convention as it enhances applied research and decision‐making by coming closer to the theoretical
ideal of how to estimate the true costs of resources. Nonetheless, the confidence one has in the opportunity cost estimates
will depend largely on how well the actual second‐best use has been defined and measured.
5 | CONCLUSION
This paper has highlighted an underrated issue in costing whose consequences are often not apparent to decision
makers, and which has been shown to confuse professional economists too. To summarise, opportunity costs are
inherently linked to choice in economics and the net trade‐off cost of the second‐best use forgone.
Bearing these theoretical considerations in mind, when aiming to estimate the opportunity costs of resources ade-
quately, is crucial for sound economic research and decision making. Various methodologies were developed in the past
that rely on different assumptions. When using the taxonomic framework that we developed to appraise the underlying
assumptions, we found that opportunity costs are often applied to valuing bed‐days in ways that are flawed and violate
economic theory. For pragmatic reasons, the special case of perfect competition has become a convention for estimating
opportunity costs, as is demonstrated through the common use of reference costs and administrative accounting data. By
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relying solely on the incurred resource consumption, cost factors are effectively disconnected from choice and the sec-
ond‐best alternative use forgone. Researchers should (a) be aware of the underlying assumptions and resulting biases
when applying these approaches, which frequently remain unmentioned and unquestioned; (b) carefully consider the
adequate costing approach dependent on an agent's objective and perspective; and (c) explicitly state any potential
implications in a manner that is comprehensible to decision makers. For decision makers aiming to maximise health,
we propose a novel alternative for bed‐days that effectively re‐connects to the concept of choice and explicitly considers
net benefits.
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